Resources without ownership — commons — are easily exploited, even wiped out. Individual fishermen have little incentive to conserve as long as others are busy catching. Evidence from a Virginia program suggests that if fishermen can buy and sell shares of the fishing quota, the fish and the fishermen may be better off.
Arnason, Ragnar. "The Icelandic Individual Transferable Quota System: A Descriptive Account," Marine Resource Economics, Fall 1993, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 201-218.
Brandt, Sylvia. "A Tale of Two Clams." Regulation, Spring 2005, pp. 18-21.
Catch Share Design Center, Environmental Defense Guide to mapping out a program
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Office of Sustainable Fisheries: details about fisheries managed by a variety of catch-share arrangements.
Costello, Christopher, John Lynham, Sarah Lester, and Steven Gaines. "Economic Incentives and Global Fisheries Sustainability." Annual Review of Resource Economics, October 2010, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 299-318.
"Managing Virginia's Marine Fisheries." A primer on fisheries management in Virginia funded by NOAA Office of Sea Grant, U.S. Department of Commerce, and Virginia Sea Grant College Program, June 2003.
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