My main research interests are in dynamic contract theory and its applications. My work focuses on dynamic principal - agent problems with moral hazard. In particular, I study situations in which the unobserved actions of the agent have a persistent effect in time. I apply some of the results of my research to the study of CEO compensation.

"Optimal Stock Option Repricing: Incentives and Learning" (2007)
"Optimal CEO Compensation and Stock Options" (2007)
"Moral Hazard and Persistence," joint with Hugo Hopenhayn (2007)
"Repeated Moral Hazard with Effort Persistence" (2005)

"Moral Hazard and Persistence", with Hugo Hopenhayn, December 2007.

PhD., Economics, University of Rochester, 2005
MA, Economics, University of Rochester, 2001
B.A. Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain, 1998