2014 Estimate

Liz Marshall, Sabrina Pellerin, and John Walter

Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
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Bailout Barometer as of Dec. 31, 2014*

As used by Walter and Weinberg (2002) and Malysheva and Walter (2010), the phrase government guarantee means a federal government commitment to protect lenders from losses due to a borrower’s default. Following this definition, we include in our estimate of the size of the safety net (which we call our “Bailout Barometer”) insured bank and thrift deposits, certain other banking company liabilities, some government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) liabilities, selected private employer pension liabilities, the dollar value of money market mutual fund shares, as well as a subset of the liabilities of other financial firms.

Our most recent estimate (using data as of Dec. 31, 2014), like past estimates, includes a mixture of elements. To start, we include all liabilities that are explicitly guaranteed by the federal government. These liabilities make up over a third of all financial sector liabilities. Some other liabilities are believed by many market participants to be implicitly guaranteed by the federal government. Examples of implicitly guaranteed liabilities include short-term liabilities of the largest banking companies, some deposit balances not explicitly covered by deposit insurance, and the liabilities of certain government-sponsored enterprises. Our approach to estimating implicit guarantees is to ask, “Based on past government actions, what might market participants reasonably expect future government actions to be?” Our “Bailout Barometer” includes explicitly guaranteed liabilities and our estimate of implicitly guaranteed liabilities.

Of course, market expectations cannot be precisely estimated given that they will vary with circumstances – more severe financial problems would likely lead to more widespread bailouts – and, for a given set of circumstances, will vary among market participants – with some participants perceiving more widespread guarantees than others. Therefore, our Bailout Barometer should be thought of as an informed approximation with a margin of error created by the variety of possible market expectations.

To illustrate one way in which market expectations could exceed our estimate: Some participants may imagine that the government would be likely to protect all non-parent holding company liabilities of the largest bank and savings and loan holding companies – as of 2014 there were 38 holding companies with assets greater than $50 billion.¹ A reason for such an expectation arises from the FDIC’s announced intention to use its Single-Point-of-Entry (SPOE) resolution procedure to ensure that subsidiaries of important financial companies continue operating even after the company has experienced financial difficulties.² We have not chosen to include all non-parent liabilities of the 38 largest holding companies because: 1) there are “no past government actions” indicating how SPOE might be applied (indeed, as of this writing, SPOE is just a proposal); 2) the FDIC has indicated in its SPOE proposal that it plans to allow non-parent creditors of holding companies resolved using the SPOE process to suffer losses (see page 76623 of the proposal); and 3) the SPOE proposal (footnote 5 on page 76618 and footnote 10 on page 76622) and the final FDIC resolution rule (page 41644) have indicated an emphasis on only granting

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¹The authors Liz Marshall (elizabeth.marshall@rich.frb.org), Sabrina Pellerin (sabrina.pellerin@rich.frb.org), and John Walter (john.walter@rich.frb.org) wish to acknowledge Brenton Mathews’ valuable help gathering and analyzing data.
special treatment for short-term creditors. Therefore, our estimate includes all the liabilities of the largest four bank holding companies (for reasons explained on page 4 of this document) but only the short-term liabilities of the remaining 34 firms. Additionally, we include in our implicit measure only those securities brokers and dealers (broker-dealers) owned by large domestic bank and savings and loan holding companies, and no stand-alone or foreign-owned broker-dealers. Some fairly large broker-dealers, however, are not in domestic holding companies so that some market participants might imagine that such broker-dealers would also receive government protection if troubled.

Likewise, market expectations of the amount of liabilities likely to be protected might be smaller than our estimate. One can imagine circumstances under which creditors of the largest firms would be provided no government assistance. For example, if the failure of one of the largest four firms were to occur because of problems only at that firm and not because of financial-system-wide problems (as in the case of the Barings failure in 1995) the federal government might allow the firm to go into bankruptcy and protect none of its creditors. Similarly, some market participants might imagine that in a future financial crisis the government could abstain from offering to protect all MMFs investors (in contrast to its actions in 2008 when it offered to protect all MMF investors). Market participants might well believe that some MMFs might need no government assistance even in the worst financial crises (such as those that invest largely in Treasury securities) or that some smaller MMFs might be allowed to suffer losses.

See the Methodology and Sources section for greater detail on what we included in our explicit and implicit categories for each liability type and why.
# Bailout Barometer

Data as of December 31, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Firms (in billions)</th>
<th>Explicitly Guaranteed Liabilities (A)</th>
<th>Implicitly Guaranteed Liabilities (B)</th>
<th>Bailout Barometer (A+B)</th>
<th>Total Liabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banking &amp; Saving Firms (includes BHCs &amp; SLHCs)</td>
<td>$6,204</td>
<td>$7,390</td>
<td>$13,594</td>
<td>$17,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35.1%</td>
<td>41.8%</td>
<td>76.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Unions</td>
<td>$903</td>
<td>$8</td>
<td>$911</td>
<td>$958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>94.2%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>95.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSEs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fannie Mae</td>
<td>$3,244</td>
<td>$3,244</td>
<td>$3,244</td>
<td>$3,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freddie Mac</td>
<td>$1,943</td>
<td>$1,943</td>
<td>$1,943</td>
<td>$1,943</td>
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<tr>
<td>Farm Credit System</td>
<td></td>
<td>$251</td>
<td>$251</td>
<td>$251</td>
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<tr>
<td>Federal Home Loan Banks</td>
<td></td>
<td>$866</td>
<td>$866</td>
<td>$866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$5,187</td>
<td>$1,117</td>
<td>$6,304</td>
<td>$6,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>82.3%</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Employer Pension Funds</td>
<td>$2,919</td>
<td>$2,919</td>
<td>$3,136</td>
<td>$3,136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>93.1%</td>
<td>93.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money Market Mutual Funds</td>
<td></td>
<td>$2,725</td>
<td>$2,725</td>
<td>$2,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Financial Firms</td>
<td></td>
<td>$75</td>
<td>$75</td>
<td>$12,870</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total for Financial Firms</td>
<td>$15,213</td>
<td>$11,315</td>
<td>$26,529</td>
<td>$43,690</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Percentage of Total Liabilities                       | 34.8%                                 | 25.9%                                 | 60.7%                   | 100.0%           |
Methodology and Sources

Banking and Savings Firms

Explicitly Guaranteed Liabilities – FDIC-insured deposits of all commercial banks and savings institutions (domestic deposits up to the $250,000 insurance limit).

Implicitly Guaranteed Liabilities – In our Bailout Barometer, we include total liabilities of the four largest banking institutions (those larger than $1 trillion in assets)\(^3\) minus insured domestic deposits (included in explicit column); plus short-term liabilities (fed funds, repurchase agreements [“repos”], commercial paper, and other short-term liabilities as reported in banking institution financial reports)\(^4\) and uninsured domestic deposits\(^5\) of the 34 bank and savings and loan holding companies (beyond the four largest) with assets greater than $50 billion.

Four largest banking institutions – During the financial turmoil of 2008 and 2009, the government promised to provide capital if needed by any of the largest 19 bank holding companies (BHCs) such that their operations could continue uninterrupted, encouraging the view that all liability-holders of these firms would be protected. However, the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) provisions in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) may reduce the likelihood that these companies would receive capital injections to allow their uninterrupted operation. Nevertheless, one can imagine that many market participants will remain skeptical that the government would allow operations of the very largest and most systemically important institutions to be disrupted, even if the interruption might be minimized and carefully managed by the OLA process.\(^6\) As a result, our Bailout Barometer includes all of the liabilities of the four largest companies.

Short-term liabilities – Market participants might expect that the short-term liabilities of large financial firms would be protected if the firms are resolved under the OLA. Both bank holding companies and savings and loan holding companies (SLHCs) with assets greater than $50 billion are likely to be considered for OLA treatment if they experience financial distress. Moreover, all bank holding companies with assets greater than $50 billion have been designated as systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). While a SIFI designation does not necessarily imply OLA treatment in resolution, market participants are likely to expect that these institutions would not be allowed to enter bankruptcy because it seems ill-suited to handle the failure of SIFIs (Pellerin and Walter 2012, p. 14–16). The OLA provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act permit the FDIC to pay some creditors more than bankruptcy might allow (Pellerin and Walter 2012, p. 16) and the FDIC’s OLA implementing rule suggests that this treatment could apply to short-term creditors (FDIC final rule, July 15, 2011, 12 CFR 380, p. 41644). Therefore, we include the short-term liabilities of all BHCs and SLHCs with assets exceeding $50 billion in our Bailout Barometer.

Uninsured domestic deposits – Historically, uninsured depositors in the largest institutions have been protected (Walter and Weinberg, 2002, p. 380). Additionally, most uninsured depositors were protected during the bank failures that occurred following the financial crisis that began in 2008. Given these facts, market participants are likely to expect uninsured depositors at the
largest banking companies (those with over $50 billion in assets) to be protected from losses in future financial crises.

Total Liabilities – Includes total liabilities of BHCs and SLHCs, total liabilities of banks and thrifts not owned by BHCs or SLHCs, plus total liabilities of U.S insured branches of foreign banks.

Credit Unions

 Explicitly Guaranteed Liabilities – Total credit union shares (deposits) up to the $250,000 NCUA insurance coverage limit.

 Implicitly Guaranteed Liabilities – In our Bailout Barometer, we include the short-term liabilities and uninsured deposits of credit unions with assets greater than $50 billion.

 Short-term liabilities – Financial institutions of this size are likely to be considered for OLA treatment if they experience financial distress. The OLA provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act permit the FDIC to pay some creditors more than bankruptcy might allow (Pellerin and Walter 2012, p. 16) and the FDIC’s OLA implementing rule suggests that this treatment could apply to short-term creditors (FDIC final rule, July 15, 2011, 12 CFR 380, p. 41644). Therefore, we include short-term liabilities of these credit unions in our Bailout Barometer.

 Uninsured deposits – Historically, uninsured depositors in the largest institutions have been protected (Walter and Weinberg, 2002, p. 380). Therefore, market participants may expect uninsured depositors at the largest credit unions (those with over $50 billion in assets) to be protected from losses in future financial crises.

Total Liabilities – Total credit union liabilities as of Dec. 31, 2014.

GSEs

 Explicitly Guaranteed Liabilities:

 Since Sept. 6, 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been in conservatorship under the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). Under the agreements associated with the conservatorship, the Treasury has committed to ensuring that each entity maintains a positive net worth. Given this explicit promise of support, explicitly guaranteed liabilities will include:

 Fannie Mae (Federal National Mortgage Association) – Total liabilities.

 Freddie Mac (Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation) – Total liabilities.

 Implicitly Guaranteed Liabilities:

 Both Fannie Mae and the Farm Credit System were bailed out with federal government loans when they experienced financial trouble in the 1980s. Furthermore, the bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 2008 during the financial crisis reinforced the perception that all of the large, systemically important GSEs will be bailed out in the event of financial trouble. Therefore, we include the liabilities of the remaining two GSEs in our Bailout Barometer:
Pension Funds

Explicitly Guaranteed Liabilities – According to a paper co-authored by staff members at the International Monetary Fund and the BEA, “as a percentage of assets held by private [defined benefit] pension plans, over 98 percent of the plans are covered under the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) in recent years.”\(^{19}\) We use this 98 percent asset coverage as a proxy for liability coverage and multiply our 2014 total liability figure for private defined benefit pension plans ($3,136 billion – see below for description) by 0.98 to reach $3,073 billion in liabilities of PBGC-guaranteed plans. Since the PBGC covers pensions only up to a specified maximum payment per year, the portion of beneficiaries’ pensions that exceed the maximum is not guaranteed by the PBGC. According to the PBGC, this portion is estimated to be 4 percent to 5 percent.\(^{20}\) We thus multiply the figure for liabilities of PBGC-guaranteed plans ($3,073 billion) by 0.95 to yield $2,919 billion to arrive at the explicitly guaranteed portion of PBGC-guaranteed pension funds.

Total Liabilities- Includes total liabilities of defined benefit plans held by private pension funds, as reported by the Board of Governor’s Financial Accounts of the United States ("Flow of Funds"). The Flow of Funds obtains this figure from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), which bases its estimates on Form 5500 filings from employee benefit plans.

Money Market Mutual Funds

Implicitly Guaranteed Liabilities – Total net assets of money market mutual funds (MMFs).\(^{21}\) Included because the federal government protection that was granted to MMFs in 2008 implies that market participants could view MMFs as being likely to receive government protection in future financial crises. New SEC rules, which take effect in 2016, may minimize the danger of runs on some MMFs and therefore the market’s perception of federal government protection.\(^{22}\) The new rules would require institutional “prime” MMFs and institutional municipal MMFs to float their net asset values (NAVs) rather than use stable NAVs as they are currently permitted to do. Commentators maintain that stable NAVs contribute to the likelihood of runs, and therefore encourage government intervention.

Other Financial Firms

Implicitly Guaranteed Liabilities – Short-term liabilities (repo, commercial paper, and other short-term liabilities with original maturities less than or equal to one year) of those nonbank financial companies that have been designated as SIFIs by the Financial Stability Oversight Council.

Market participants might expect that the short-term liabilities of large financial firms that are designated as SIFIs would be protected if the firm is resolved under the OLA. While a SIFI designation does not necessarily imply OLA treatment in resolution, market participants are likely to expect that these institutions will not be allowed to enter bankruptcy because it seems ill-suited to handle the failure of SIFIs (Pellerin and Walter 2012, p. 14-16). The OLA provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act permit the FDIC
to pay some creditors more than bankruptcy might allow (Pellerin and Walter 2012, p. 16), and the FDIC’s OLA implementing rule suggests that this treatment could apply to short-term creditors (FDIC final rule, July 15, 2011, 12 CFR 380, p. 41644). Therefore, we include short-term liabilities of these SIFI-designated firms in our Bailout Barometer.

**Total Liabilities** – Includes the aggregate amount of liabilities outstanding as of December 2014 from each nonbank financial sector, including:

- Property-Casualty Insurance Companies
- Life Insurance Companies
- Security Brokers and Dealers
- Issuers of Asset-Backed Securities
- Finance Companies
- Real Estate Investment Trusts
- Funding Corporations

Total liabilities figures for those Property-Casualty Insurance Companies, Life Insurance Companies, and Security Brokers and Dealers that are not owned by BHCs and SLHCs are obtained from SNL Financial. Total liability figures for Issuers of Asset-Backed Securities, Finance Companies, Real Estate Investment Trust, or Funding Corporations (“remaining financial sectors”) are obtained from the Board of Governor’s Flow of Funds Statistical Release. Some firms in the remaining financial sectors are directly owned by U.S. BHCs or SLHCs, and their liabilities are thus already included in our Total Liability figure for Banking and Savings Firms; however, nonbank firms that are directly owned by a BHC or SLHC are (with some exceptions – such as for the smallest of these firms) required to file a Y-11 or Y-11S report (Financial Statements of U.S. Nonbank Subsidiaries of U.S. Bank Holding Companies). We thus avoid double counting the liabilities in these BHC- or SLHC-owned firms by subtracting the liabilities of all Y-11/Y-11S filers that we believe to be Issuers of Asset-Backed Securities, Finance Companies, Real Estate Investment Trusts, or Funding Corporations from the total liabilities of the remaining financial sectors, as collected from the Flow of Funds.24

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1 According to the Dodd-Frank Act, all bank holding companies with assets greater than $50 billion are designated as systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). Although several savings and loan holding companies have more than $50 billion in assets, they are not automatically designated as SIFIs like bank holding companies.


3 Consolidated Statements for Bank Holding Companies (FR Y9C)
Our primary source is corporate annual reports because they report short-term liabilities with original maturities of less than one year. FR Y9C uses a broader definition of “other short-term liabilities,” one which includes liabilities that may have had original maturities greater than one year. When the top tier is a foreign holding company, we gather data on specific short-term liabilities (fed funds, repos, and commercial paper, almost all of which have original maturities of less than one year) from FR Y9C because FR Y9C contains data only on the U.S. subsidiaries, so it excludes liabilities of foreign subsidiaries. We then review the call reports to find any additional U.S. subsidiary short-term borrowings (e.g. FHLB advances with original maturities of less than one year) that the FR Y9C does not separately report. When available, we use average figures. We also add “securities loaned” when it is included as a separate line item distinct from repos.

“Deposits held in domestic offices” minus “estimated insured deposits” from the FDIC’s report that collects data from individual call reports of the insured subsidiaries of a BHC or SLHC.


From FR Y9C and FR Y9SP.

Bank data from Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income for a Bank, FFIEC 031 and FFIEC 041.


One credit union – Navy Federal Credit Union – had assets exceeding $50 billion as of Dec. 31, 2014.

http://us.practicallaw.com/6-532-5109?source=relatedcontent


http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/310522/000031052215000081/fanniemae201410k.htm
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1026214/000102621415000015/a201410k.htm

http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/310522/000031052215000081/fanniemae201410k.htm#s8589FC5DAD0058FB184D28C7F6F59DC


23 Note that those insurance companies and securities brokers and dealers owned by BHCs and SLHCs are included in the total liabilities figure for banking and savings firms.

24 Nonbank firms that are directly owned by banks or thrifts are not required to file a Y-11, which could mean that we are double-counting some liabilities of these nonbank firms.

Last updated January 18, 2016