Staff Economists

Arantxa Jarque

headshot of Arantxa Jarque

My research interests include industrial organization, dynamic contract theory and political economy. In particular, I study dynamic principal-agent problems with moral hazard, focusing on situations in which the unobserved actions of the agent have a persistent effect in time. I have applied some of my findings to the design of optimal CEO compensation.

Professional Experience

Arantxa Jarque joined the Research Department as an economist in September 2009 after spending a year teaching economics at the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid in Spain. Jarque had been a visiting economist at the Richmond Fed from 2007 to 2008. Previously, she was an assistant professor of economics at Universidad de Alicante in Spain.

Education

Ph.D., University of Rochester, 2005
M.A., University of Rochester, 2001
B.A., Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Spain), 1998

Curriculum vitae

"Repeated Moral Hazard with Effort Persistence." Journal of Economic Theory 145, no. 6 (November 2010): 2412-2423.

"Unobservable Persistent Productivity and Long Term Contracts." (with Hugo Hopenhayn). Review of Economic Dynamics 13, no. 2 (April 2010): 333-349.

Fourth Quarter 2013

Evaluating Executive Compensation Packages

Arantxa Jarque and John Muth

Fourth Quarter 2012

Regulation and the Composition of CEO Pay

Arantxa Jarque and Brian Gaines

Fourth Quarter 2010

Hidden Effort, Learning by Doing, and Wage Dynamics

Arantxa Jarque

September 2014, No. 14-16

The Complexity of CEO Compensation

Arantxa Jarque

July 2008, No. 08-4

Repeated Moral Hazard with Effort Persistence

Arantxa Jarque

December 2007, No. 07-7

Moral Hazard and Persistence

Arantxa Jarque and Hugo Hopenhayn

"Providing Incentives for Mortgage Originators" (with Edward S. Prescott).

"The Complexity of CEO Compensation: Incentives and Learning."

Contact Us

Richmond

Arantxa Jarque
(804) 697-8337