My research interests include industrial organization, dynamic contract theory and political economy. In particular, I study dynamic principal-agent problems with moral hazard, focusing on situations in which the unobserved actions of the agent have a persistent effect in time. I have applied some of my findings to the design of optimal CEO compensation.
Arantxa Jarque joined the Research Department as an economist in September 2009 after spending a year teaching economics at the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid in Spain. Jarque had been a visiting economist at the Richmond Fed from 2007 to 2008. Previously, she was an assistant professor of economics at Universidad de Alicante in Spain.
Ph.D., University of Rochester, 2005
M.A., University of Rochester, 2001
B.A., Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Spain), 1998
"Repeated Moral Hazard with Effort Persistence." Journal of Economic Theory 145, no. 6 (November 2010): 2412-2423.
"Unobservable Persistent Productivity and Long Term Contracts." (with Hugo Hopenhayn). Review of Economic Dynamics 13, no. 2 (April 2010): 333-349.
"Providing Incentives for Mortgage Originators" (with Edward S. Prescott).
"The Complexity of CEO Compensation: Incentives and Learning."